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Abstract 
  
The objective of this article is to review extant empirical studies of empathy in narrative 
reading in light of (i) contemporary literary theory, and (ii) neuroscientific studies of empathy, 
and to discuss how a closer interplay between neuroscience and literary studies may enhance 
our understanding of empathy in narrative reading. An introduction to some of the 
philosophical roots of empathy is followed by tracing its application in contemporary literary 
theory, in which scholars have pursued empathy with varying degrees of conceptual precision, 
often within the context of embodied/enactive cognition. The presentation of empirical 
literary studies of empathy is subsequently contextualized by an overview of psychological 
and neuroscientific aspects of empathy. Highlighting points of convergence and divergence, 
the discussion illustrates how findings of empirical literary studies align with recent 
neuroscientific research. The article concludes with some prospects for future empirical 
research, suggesting that digitization may contribute to advancing the scientific knowledge of 
empathy in narrative reading. 
  
Keywords:  Embodied Cognition; Empathy; Empirical Literary Studies; Neuroscience 
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“When I think about how I understand my role as a citizen − setting aside being president; and the most 
important set of understandings that I bring to that position of citizen − the most important stuff I’ve 
learned, I think I’ve learned from novels”.1 
       US President Barack Obama 
                                                
1 From an interview that President Barack Obama conducted with the novelist Marilynne Robinson for the New 
York Review of Books, recorded in two parts and broadcast as audio podcasts on October 12, 2015 and October 
26, 2015 under the title ‘President Obama and Marilynne Robinson: A Conversation I & II’. The quote is from 
Conversation II and can be accessed at https://itunes.apple.com/us/podcast/soundings-from-new-york-
review/id284527588?mt=2 
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1.0 Introduction 
 
Contemporary defendants of literary education tend to argue that literary narratives should be 
read and studied because they foster empathy. Nested within this argument, in which 
convergent findings from neuroscience are given an increasingly prominent role, are various 
suppositions about the relationships between emotions, theory of mind, embodiment, and 
other phenomena; between the short- and long-term effects of stimulus exposure; between 
conscious vs. non-conscious, and top-down vs. bottom-up processing. These suppositions are 
seldom made explicit in the literature. However, agreement across scholarly communities, or 
even across individual authors, seems rare. This entails a largely unstable conceptualization of 
empathy as a phenomenon in reader response and beyond. In this article, we review, contrast, 
and compare findings and selected theoretical suppositions from empirical studies of narrative 
literature with those of neuroscience (Sections 4-6). Empirical literary studies are defined here 
to encompass reader response experiments targeting verbally reportable experiences and thus 
relying on some form of readers’ self-report. As such studies more often derive their rationale 
from the humanities rather than neuroscience, we open with a review on empathy in the more 
general history of ideas (Section 2) and theory of literature (Section 3). 
 
 
2.0 Empathy: historical and conceptual background 
 
The notion of empathy has received much attention in recent times. In addition to being a 
concept of scholarly interest for literary theorists, film and media scholars, philosophers, 
psychologists and neuroscientists, empathy has enjoyed a great deal of coverage in more 
everyday domains, such as the media and popular press. Recent research indicating 
correlations and even causality between literary reading or aesthetic engagement and 
prosocial behaviour (e.g., sharing, donating, volunteering), including empathy, has triggered 
an enormous interest in the psychological mechanisms involved in empathy and related, 
assumed prosocial, processes. On the one hand, this may bode for greater interdisciplinarity in 
the empirical pursuit of more precise knowledge about the experiential nature, function, 
mechanisms and effects of empathy in literary reading. On the other hand, the diversity of 
conceptualizations, paradigms, methodologies and measures presents a considerable challenge 
for any attempt to establish common research frameworks, getting an overview of extant 
research, comparing the quality of studies and validity of measures and findings, and staking 
out the most promising ways in which to contribute to scientific progress in the field. 
 
Arguably, empathy seems to be one of the most frequent, and at the same time most ill-
defined, concepts in current philosophical and psychological research. Calling them a 
“cantankerous lot”, Batson (2009, p. 3) points out that while scholars of empathy agree that 
“empathy is important, they often disagree about why it is important, about what effects it 
has, and where it comes from, and even about what it is.” (p. 3) Such diversity has prompted 
researchers (e.g., Coplan, 2011) to call for more precise and specific conceptualizations, 
reflecting in particular recent developments in cognitive neuroscience and philosophy of mind 
so as to enable more detailed descriptions and explanations of the distinct psychological 
processes involved. 
 
It is not possible to do justice to the conceptual richness and ambiguities as well as the 
philosophical controversies surrounding empathy within the confines of an article. Hence, 
what follows is a brief glance at some key contributions to the development and refinement of 
empathy as a construct of interest in philosophy and, subsequently, literary theory. The 
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objective is to indicate the composite nature of empathy as a philosophical construct, to be 
further revealed in later psychological and neuroscience research on empathy and related 
processes (see 5.0). Specifically, the philosophical understanding of empathy as either 
interpretational or experiential were to resurface in much of the experimental research that 
followed.  
 
Much of the conceptual diversity and subsequent theoretical and methodological diffusion can 
be gleaned from the historical roots of the concept. Historical accounts of empathy typically 
trace its origins to philosophical traditions, more precisely, those of hermeneutics and 
phenomenology. Whereas the psychologist Edward Titchener was the person who coined the 
term ‘empathy’ (in 1909, as the English adaptation of the German Einfühlung), the 
philosopher Theodor Lipps is the one credited for ascribing empathy a key role in philosophy 
in the broader sense, spanning the social sciences and humanities. Lipps’ central claim that 
empathy should be understood as “the primary epistemic means for our perception of other 
persons as minded creatures” was highly influential and became the focus of a considerable 
debate among philosophers at the beginning of the 20th century (Stueber, 2014). Already at 
this time, however, the understanding of empathy among philosophers was vague and 
inconsistent, which is the main reason why Lipps is now, according to Currie (2011, p. 83), 
“merely a name in historical footnotes.” 
 
The philosophical relevance of empathy can be perhaps more clearly discerned in another 
prominent philosophical school of thought, namely hermeneutics. Taken to be closely 
linked to the concept of Verstehen (understanding), empathy was associated specifically with 
the early work of Wilhelm Dilthey. Although rarely applied and never explained by Dilthey 
himself (Coplan and Goldie, 2011), the concept of empathy was readily acknowledged to be a 
useful epistemological tool for philosophers pursuing questions of understanding and 
interpretation. As implied in Verstehen, empathy was conceived as distinctive of the research 
methods used in the humanities as compared to the natural sciences, where explanatory 
paradigms are preferred over interpretive ones. However, philosophers of the hermeneutic 
tradition later dismissed the notion of empathy, in large part because it was considered to have 
little to contribute to human understanding across cultural and social differences. For this 
reason, empathy was also conceptually decoupled from the notion of understanding, hence 
allowing questions of cultural diversity to be more properly addressed. Perhaps as a 
consequence of a general surge of interest in the topic, the cross-cultural dimension of 
empathy has received renewed attention from scholars in anthropology (e.g., Hollan, 2012). 
 
Apart from the brief appearance in hermeneutics, the philosophical traditions in which 
empathy has been dealt with in the most extensive and consistent manner from its very 
inception, are phenomenology and philosophy of mind. Here, empathy continues to influence 
theoretical developments and epistemological discussion, and recent and emerging paradigms 
such as embodied – and affiliated perspectives, such as enactive, embedded, extended, 
situated, and distributed – cognition (see for instance Rowlands, 2010; Kiverstein & Clark, 
2009, Hardy-Vallée & Payette, 2009) converge to indicate a great potential for 
interdisciplinary empirical research on empathy in intersubjective understanding, as well as in 
literary reading and aesthetic appreciation overall. 
 
Historically, the phenomenological legacy of empathy is linked to a handful of early 20th 
century philosophers, most prominently, Edmund Husserl, Edith Stein, and Max Scheler 
(Stueber, 2014). Common to all three was their focus on empathy as “a non-theoretical, non-
inferential, sui generis experiential act allowing us to directly grasp another person’s 
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experiences as belonging to him, without requiring that we ourselves have similar experiences 
as those of the other person” (Stueber, 2012, p. 56). Scheler in particular is acknowledged to 
have paved the road for empathy as a key concept for later phenomenologists. At the same 
time, perhaps somewhat ironically, he is held partly responsible for the subsequent diffusion 
and lack of conceptual clarity surrounding the term when applied in philosophical thought and 
psychological studies. According to Ickes (2003), Scheler’s writing contains six core concepts 
that can all be said to at least partially embody aspects of later (mis)understandings: (i) 
compathy (referring to shared feelings due to shared circumstances); (ii) mimpathy (the 
imitation of another person’s emotions, without experiencing these oneself); (iii) sympathy 
(intentionally reacting emotionally towards another); (iv) transpathy (emotional contagion, 
where one is “infected” emotionally by another’s emotions); (v) unipathy (an intense form of 
transpathy); and (vi) empathy, (understanding another’s emotions through perspective taking). 
As pointed out in a recent review article by Cuff et al. (2016), entailed in these concepts is a 
conflation of three distinctive dimensions commonly held to define empathy (viz., the degree 
of cognitive representations of the other’s emotional state; the degree of emotion sharing; and 
the degree of self-other differentiation) and to distinguish it from closely related concepts 
such as sympathy, emotional contagion and personal distress (see also Coplan, 2011). In 
retrospect, one can say that Scheler’s prolific writing served to make evident the complexity 
of the construct and the necessity to pursue more precise definitions, a task that has haunted 
psychologists and philosophers of empathy ever since. 
 
Empathy is often discussed in conceptual tandem with the notion of theory of mind (ToM), 
i.e., the general capacity to cognitively grasp the mental states of others. Broadly speaking, in 
philosophy there are currently two main lines of thought: theory theory (TT) and simulation 
theory (ST). Theory theorists claim that our mindreading abilities rest fundamentally on 
theoretical inferences and on an understanding and application of principles drawn from folk 
psychology. We are able to understand other people’s plans, beliefs, values, and desires by 
way of analogical reasoning, inferring that others are the same in this respect as we are 
ourselves. Simulation theory advocates, on the other hand, claim that our interpretation and 
understanding of other people is guided by our ability to empathically put ourselves in the 
shoes of the other by simulating the mental states we would have in their situation (see, e.g., 
de Bruin, Strijbos, & Slors 2014; and see Kögler & Stueber, 2000 for an overview). 
According to de Bruin et al., most theorists and philosophers nowadays favor “a ‘hybrid’ 
model of mindreading” in which both theory and simulation play a role (de Bruin, Strijbos, & 
Slors, 2014, p. 173).2 
 
Generally assumed to mediate prosocial behavior, empathy is increasingly studied with the 
objective of mapping its contribution in the nurture of ethically appropriate conduct and moral 
development. This strand has been taken up by a number of contemporary philosophers, 
perhaps most notably Martha Nussbaum, who argues that literature and in particular the 
novel, through its potential for expanding our empathy, provides us with the means for 
developing and fine-tuning a sense of social justice and morality (e.g., the chapter 
“Cultivating Imagination: Literature and the Arts,” in Nussbaum, 2010). The quotation that 
opens this article by US President Barack Obama falls directly within the scope of 
Nussbaum’s claim. 
 
                                                
2 It is fair to say that analytic philosophy and logical positivism in general would reject both TT and ST as keys 
to empathy. However, this seeming dichotomy is not as irreconcilable as it may seem (see, for example, Chase 
and Reynolds 2014, pp. 238-239). 
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To sum up, this subsection proposed that recent findings of the correlations between literary 
reading and behaviors such as sharing, donating and volunteering have prompted interest in 
comprehensive interdisciplinary research in the neural, psychological, phenomenal, 
experiential and social dimensions of empathy as a significant part of prosocial behavior. The 
different approaches demonstrate considerable variation in scientific methods, 
conceptualizations of mechanisms and use of measurements that challenge the systematic 
accounts of extant research. However, the original perception of empathy as a philosophical 
concept within hermeneutics and phenomenology captures two contrasting views that despite 
not being fully congruent seem to reappear across disciplines, namely the understanding of 
others in the interpretive and in the experiential senses. This dichotomous understanding of 
empathy also concurs with contemporary philosophical discussions of theory of mind that 
distinguish TT and the ability to understand others through analogy from ST, which suggests 
that our understanding of others’ minds rests on our ability to simulate their phenomenal 
states. The different variations of this polarized approach to empathy are a recurrent theme in 
the following. 
 
 
3.0 Empathy in contemporary literary theory  
 
Throughout the twentieth century, literary theory shied away from considering the first-person 
experience of reading. When the act of reading was theorized at all, the reader in question – 
dubbed “model”, “competent”, or the like – was a construct based on the sum of alleged 
interpretive cues in a text, a disembodied entity possessing the expertise and exclusive 
intellectual interests of an academic professional. Empathy with fictional characters was 
mostly seen as the epitome of the naïveté ascribed to non-professional readers, and thus not 
worthy of academic study. Today, with the sciences of the mind rapidly gaining traction 
among the general public, literary theorists too are beginning to systematically focus on the 
affective and cognitive processes associated with understanding literary characters.3 
 
With a notable exception (Keen, 2006, 2007), however, reader response processes directly 
relevant to empathy are currently theorized without extensive reference to the concept of 
empathy proper. Although the word empathy is increasingly mentioned in literary theoretical 
writing (e.g. Mellmann, 2010), the mechanics of readers’ vicarious experiencing are more 
often described with reference to the broader conceptual frameworks of embodied and 
enactive cognition. Varieties and aspects of readers’ empathy are treated under different labels 
such as simulation (e.g. Caracciolo, 2014a), enactment (e.g. Kuzmičová, 2012), 
intercorporeity (Chapelle Wojciehowski & Gallese, 2011), and so forth. In addition to 
emotions, empathy thus broadly conceived encompasses any vicarious experiences in the 
reader’s embodied mind that are contingent upon the embodied experiences of fictional 
characters. Vicarious sharing of characters’ emotions is then understood to go hand in hand, 
                                                
3 See, for example, Burke’s focus on what he terms ‘affective cognition’ (as opposed to ‘cognitive emotion’) in 
his 2011 study on ‘oceanic’ modes of literary discourse processing, which draw on LeDoux’s 1998 
neuroscientific distinction between the ‘high road’ and ‘low road’ to emotion. Burke’s two concepts are not 
dualistic categories. Rather, they appear on a continuum and their involvement depends on the context or kairos 
of the reading event. For avid and engaged readers of literary fiction, conscious and non-conscious prompts to 
affective cognition include (i) the time and location of the physical act of reading, (ii) the pre-reading mood of 
the individual, (iii) the quality and content of mental imagery generated while reading literature, (iv) the 
rhetorical style of language deployed (consciously or otherwise), and (v) literary themes involved. These are 
what Burke refers to as the ‘affective inputs’ of reading in the oceanic mind. (See also Burke 2013, 2015 & 
2016).  
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in possibility (Caracciolo, 2014b) or even by necessity (Miall, 2011), with such embodied 
experiences.  
 
The one author consistently and comprehensively probing the concept of empathy narrowly 
defined as the vicarious sharing of characters’ emotions, is Keen (2006, 2007). Although 
Keen acknowledges that empathic reader response can also enlist other than strictly emotional 
phenomena (e.g., the bodily sensations of silence and humidity invoked when reading about a 
forest), her primary focus is on characters’ emotions. This is a consequence of her ethical 
rationale; Keen queries the use value of the novelistic genre, advocated by Nussbaum (2010), 
in fostering good moral sense and social responsibility. In pursuit of this objective, she 
reviews a large corpus of empirical reader response studies to conclude that no narrative 
technique (first- vs. third-person narration, past vs. present tense, etc.) has as yet been 
unequivocally proven to enhance readers’ empathy per se. In her account, narrative technique 
always operates in concert with subject matter, reading situation, and other variables. Instead 
of linking circumscribed textual features with discrete types of reading experience, Keen 
chooses to present a more coarse-grained typology of novelistic strategies for empathy, one 
that also concerns the social circumstances of a novel’s production and reception. The 
typology distinguishes between three general strategies: bounded empathy (within an in-
group), ambassadorial empathy (addressing a specific audience outside an in-group), and 
broadcast empathy (addressing anyone outside an in-group). 
 
In absence of compelling evidence for the effect of discrete narrative forms, Keen suggests 
that novels are possibly distinctive in their capacity to elicit empathy by virtue of being 
fictitious (Keen, 2007, p. 4), rather than exclusively or primarily for their aesthetic merit. 
According to Keen, the reader’s awareness of reading a piece of fiction, devoid of real-world 
demands for immediate action on behalf of the wronged, is precisely what could make novels 
a particularly efficient arena for emotional training. However, Keen is reluctant to endorse 
strong generalizations about the long-term moral consequences of such training. 
 
Within the embodied and enactive cognition strands of contemporary literary theory, the 
narrow notion of empathy is addressed less directly than in Keen’s work. Here the primary 
focus lies outside the strictly emotional realm, and largely also outside ethical concerns. The 
field is defined by an overarching interest for the role of the body in the pleasures and 
intellectual adventures of reading. Empathy is usually approached in piecemeal insights 
concerning the textual underpinnings of embodied aesthetic responses such as character-
centered mental imagery (Jajdelska, Butler, Kelly, McNeill, & Overy, 2010; Kuzmičová, 
2014), visceral experience from sensuous narrative (Burke 2011 on ‘reader disportation’ and 
Kimmel, 2011), as well as more indistinct experiences such as increased bodily awareness 
(Esrock, 2004). While most of this literature refrains from systematic adherence to embodied 
and enactive cognition as a school of philosophical thought, a more comprehensive and 
philosophically aspiring account can be found in the work of Caracciolo (especially 2014b). 
Caracciolo (2014b, pp. 129–132) is also the literary theorist to explicitly tackle the 
relationships between embodiment, enaction, and empathy in the narrow sense. 
 
Caracciolo’s treatment of empathy and empathy-relevant phenomena in reading is framed by 
his revision, formulated from the viewpoint of enactivist philosophy of mind, of two 
influential assumptions of narrative theory: firstly, the assumption that narrative fiction is 
unique in providing its readers access to the private experiences of other human beings; 
secondly, the assumption that readers’ stance toward literary characters can be 
straightforwardly modulated by the use of distinct narrative techniques (e.g., internal vs. 
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external focalization). Caracciolo takes care to explain why these assumptions are only partly 
true. 
 
As for the first assumption, Caracciolo (e.g. 2014b, pp. 110–125) contends that readers access 
the minds of literary characters not in some unique way, but in much the same way as they 
access the minds of their flesh-and-blood peers: by third-person theory of mind, i.e., inference 
from linguistic expressions and overt behavior. This level of engagement with a fictional 
character’s experience is what he calls consciousness-attribution. Sometimes, however, 
consciousness-attribution serves as the basis for an additional level of engagement, i.e., 
consciousness-enactment. Consciousness-enactment entails a first-person stance. It is 
particularly likely to occur when events and existents in a narrative strongly overlap with the 
reader’s own experiential background, i.e., with her unique reservoir of past experiences – 
emotional, social, sensory, or other. Importantly, consciousness-enactment in one of these 
domains does not necessarily entail simultaneous consciousness-enactment in all the other 
domains. For instance, it is possible to enact a character’s bodily sensations while consciously 
retaining third-person distance from the character’s feelings, beliefs, or attitudes. At a later 
point in the same narrative and reading session, the reverse may become true. 
 
In Caracciolo’s account, synchronous consciousness-enactment across all aspects of a 
character’s experience is relatively rare. As for the second assumption under revision, he 
shares Keen’s skepticism toward any attempts to align enactment effects, in a straightforward 
one-to-one relationship, with isolated textual features. But he does invent a label – 
consciousness-focused narration – for narrative styles that are more efficient than others in 
covering the full range of human experientiality and making it potentially salient to the reader 
through consciousness-enactment. On the cline from word to paragraph level, the typical 
features of consciousness-focused narration range from the use of certain pronouns and verbs 
of experiencing, through expressive punctuation and experiential metaphors, to internal 
focalization (Caracciolo 2014b, pp. 104–109; 125–129). While ethical and utilitarian 
considerations are overtly absent from Caracciolo’s theoretical model, its basic tenets have 
been used to put forward an argument for the power of narrative to open readers’ mental 
horizons, via embodied enactment and empathy, toward otherwise inaccessible concepts and 
phenomena, including the experiences of non-human beings (Bernaerts, Caracciolo, Herman, 
& Vervaeck, 2014). 
 
Although some embodied theories of reading have expressly focused on backgrounding 
textual strategies that make the literary medium as transparent as possible (Jajdelska et al., 
2010; Kuzmičová, 2012), there is also a substantial argument toward the view that empathy 
may be enhanced (Caracciolo, 2014b; Kimmel, 2011), or even preconditioned (Miall & 
Kuiken, 1999), by defamiliarization and foregrounding (e.g. novel metaphors). Finally, it 
should be acknowledged that throughout the history of literary theory, ontological entities 
other than fictional characters, i.e., impersonal narrators (Currie, 2010) and flesh-and-blood 
authors (Poulet, 1969), have also been cited as the prime objects of empathy-like responses in 
reading. However, the elusiveness of these entities in terms of circumscribed textual features 
makes their operationalization in empirically testable hypotheses even more problematic than 
above theories of empathy with characters. 
 
The present section has charted diverse approaches to reader-character empathy in 
contemporary literary theory. With one notable exception (Keen 2006, 2007), empathy is 
treated more or less tangentially as one of several dimensions or outcomes in the broader 
landscape of readers’ cognitive, affective, and embodied responses. This lack of narrower 
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focus on empathy may partly be explained by the sheer novelty, within a field that was 
previously strictly text-oriented, of accounting for readers’ subjective experiences. Overall, it 
is fair to say that literary theorists, including Keen whose work is dedicated to empathy, have 
been cautious of categorically elevating empathy above other types of response in either 
aesthetic or didactic value. Rather, as a first step towards a closer investigation of empathy 
specifically, an increasing number of theorists are taking care to emphasize that reader 
response is inseparable from embodied and enactive sense-making more generally. The most 
important contribution of literary theorists to the debate on empathy in reading may lie in their 
nuanced view of readers’ responses as multi-layered rather than divisible into separate 
categories. Caracciolo’s (2014b) suggestion that first-person empathic enactment of one 
particular emotion or sensation does not preclude a third-person, more distanced perspective 
on other aspects of a story, is one particularly potent instantiation of this relative sensitivity of 
theory. The overall reluctance to align empathic response with circumscribed textual features 
is another example. Albeit clear and intuitive, such insights potentially push the limits of 
experimental design in empirical disciplines.  
 
 
4.0 Empirical literary studies on empathy 
 
Many illuminating empirical studies have been conducted on the nexus between narrative 
reading and individuals’ social, cognitive and emotive behavior and experience. However, 
only a small subset of these studies primarily addresses the construct of empathy and/or 
empathy-related responses to story characters, specifically. 
 
In an experiment exclusively focusing on long-term effects, Mar et al. (2006) found that 
contrary to commonplaces that circulate in many communities that ‘bookworms’ tend to be 
socially awkward, people who read fiction frequently will enhance and/or maintain their 
social abilities. This was in contrast to frequent readers of non-fiction. In essence, the claim is 
that understanding characters in prose fiction appears to be akin to understanding people in 
the real world, something non-fiction lacks. In the same experiment, the researchers also 
looked at lifelong exposure to fiction and non-fiction texts focusing on performance on 
empathy and social-acumen measures. It was discovered that exposure to fiction positively 
predicted measures of social ability, while exposure to non-fiction was a negative predictor. 
This experiment was followed up with a second study conducted by Mar, Oatley and Peterson 
(2009) in which they successfully ruled out the role of personality affecting their results. This 
trait was statistically controlled for, together with two other important individual differences: 
(1) the tendency to be drawn into stories, and (2) gender. After accounting for these variables, 
fiction exposure still predicted performance on an empathy task. The results were extended 
and it was found that exposure to fiction was still positively correlated with self-reported 
social support, while exposure to nonfiction was still negatively associated with self-reported 
social support. 
 
In their study on the potential of literature to increase empathy in the short term, Djikic, 
Oatley and Moldoveanu (2013) conducted a number of experiments that sought to measure 
lifelong exposure to fiction and nonfiction, personality traits, and affective and cognitive 
empathy.4 They first had the participants read either an essay or a short story. The texts were 
                                                
4 These terms are taken from Davis’s (1983) Interpersonal Reactivity Index which distinguishes scales of 
Empathetic Concern, which Davis calls Affective Empathy, and the scale of Perspective Taking, which he calls 
Cognitive Empathy. The distinction here is broadly between the ability to share the feelings of others (sometimes 
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equivalent in length and complexity. The participants were tested again for cognitive and 
affective empathy. Finally, they were tested on a non-self-report measure of empathy. The 
results of their experiment showed that participants who read a short story (and also those 
who scored low in the category of openness) experienced significant increases in self-reported 
cognitive empathy.5 However, no increases in affective empathy were found, and no effects 
on Reading the Mind in the Eyes (RMET) measures.6 Participants who were frequent fiction-
readers had higher scores on the non-self-report measure of empathy. These results suggest 
that there is a role for prose fiction to play in assisting the development of empathy. 
 
Johnson (2013) conducted two studies that investigated how literary fiction might be able to 
reduce prejudice and increase empathy. Participants in the study were asked to read an excerpt 
from a fictional novel about a non-stereotypical Arab-Muslim woman. Individuals who 
reported being more transported into the story rated Arab-Muslims significantly lower in 
stereotypical negative traits. They also exhibited significantly lower negative attitudes toward 
Arab-Muslims post-reading than individuals who were less transported into the story. 
Crucially, these effects persisted after controlling for (i) baseline Arab-Muslim prejudice, (ii) 
reading-induced mood change, and (iii) demand characteristics. Affective empathy for Arab-
Muslims and intrinsic motivation to reduce prejudice were also significantly increased by the 
story and each provided independent explanatory mechanisms for transportation’s association 
with prejudice reduction. Johnson’s study suggests not only that transportation into literary 
fiction reduces prejudice against minorities and increases empathy for them, but that such 
prose reading episodes can be fruitfully incorporated into educational and applied settings. 
 
In another ‘socially-related’ study, Koopman (2015) investigated the effects of text genre, 
personal factors and affective responses during reading on two types of empathy: empathic 
understanding and pro-social behavior, namely, donating.7 Participants in her study read two 
texts within the same genre (expository, non-fiction life narrative, literary narrative) about 
depression and grief. There was one week between the sessions. The results were as follows: 
(i) a genre effect was observed for prosocial behavior in the case of depression, with more 
people donating in the life narrative condition, as compared to the literary condition, (ii) 
personal experience predicted empathic understanding and prosocial behavior for depression, 
but not for grief, and (iii) empathic understanding was further predicted by trait empathy, 
exposure to literature, and sympathy/empathy with the character. The results of her 
experiments validate the relevance of looking at readers’ personal characteristics. They also 
suggest a repeated exposure effect of literature on empathic understanding. Another 
interesting outcome of this study is that it might very well be narrativity, rather than 
                                                                                                                                                   
referred to as ‘emotional empathy’) and the capacity to represent others’ intentions and beliefs (sometimes 
referred to as ToM or Theory of Mind). The two remaining dimensions on Davis’ Index are ‘fantasy’ and 
‘personal distress’. The first of these relates to the inclinations of subjects to imaginatively transpose themselves 
into the feelings and actions of characters in films, plays and works of literary fiction. The second measures the 
self-focussed feelings of individual anxiety and uneasiness that occurs in tense interpersonal situations. 
5 ‘Openness’ is a personality trait measured with the ‘Big Five Inventory’ (see John, Donahue, & Kentle, 1991). 
The Big Five Inventory is a multidimensional personality, self-report inventory with 44 items designed to 
measure Extraversion, Conscientiousness, Openness, Agreeableness and Emotional Stability. It consists of short 
phrases with relatively accessible vocabulary such as “tends to be quiet”, “can be moody”, etc. Responses are 
scored on a 5-item Likert scale. 
6 The Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test is an advanced test of theory of mind and was first developed by Baron-
Cohen et al. 2001. 
7 Koopman suggests that empathic understanding is an attitudinal measure (empathic reactions) that is more 
closely related to empathy in real life than to ToM measures (cognitive empathy). 
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fictionality, that is a key concept here. This is supported by one of the outcomes listed above, 
namely, that it was the life narrative text/condition and not the literary text/condition that was 
related to a significantly higher likelihood of donating behavior. As Koopman suggests in her 
discussion, maybe it is the excessively foregrounded features that are often present in literary 
fictive texts that affect the quality of the emotions that are generated, something that is not an 
issue in the often less-foregrounded fluidity of real-life narrative texts. 
 
In a study by Wallentin et al (2013), young adults were asked to rate emotional intensity on 
line-to-line level while listening to a fairy tale. They also took an empathy test. The results 
showed how empathy correlates well with overall level of experienced intensity. Interestingly, 
no correlation with empathy was found in the parts of the story that received highest intensity 
ratings across participants. A reverse correlation analysis then revealed that these parts 
contained physical threat scenarios, while parts where empathy is correlated with intensity 
described social interaction that can only be understood through mentalizing. The results of 
this study suggest that narratives evoke emotions based on both simple physical contagion 
(i.e. affective empathy) and on complex mentalizing (i.e. affective theory of mind, sometimes 
alternatively called cognitive empathy) and that these effects may be more or less 
independent. 
 
Kidd and Castano (2013) conducted a series of five experiments. The results, published in the 
journal Science, showed that reading literary fiction led to better performance on tests of 
affective theory of mind and cognitive theory of mind (the RMET and the Yoni Test were 
used) compared to reading non-fiction, popular fiction or nothing at all, suggesting that 
literary fiction improves a reader’s capacity to understand what others are thinking and 
feeling.8 In short, that literary reading has an effect on empathic aptitude. A comparable study 
was conducted by Bal and Veltkamp (2013) into whether reading fiction can change empathy 
in a reader. In two experiments it was predicted that when people read fiction - and they are 
emotionally transported into the story -, they become more empathic. This increase in a 
capacity for empathic feeling lasted for at least one week (until the participants were tested 
again). Conversely, participants who were not transported into the story had lower empathy in 
both studies. These effects were not found in the non-fiction reading control group. This study 
suggests that fiction influences reader empathy, but only when readers are transported into a 
story. 
 
In a study focusing on sympathy, a concept close to empathy (see Scheler’s earlier-mentioned 
six-part division in section 2.0), Cupchik, Oatley and Vorderer (1998) examined emotional 
responses to excerpts from short stories by the same author.9 The participants in the 
experiment read four short story excerpts each divided into four segments of equal length. 
Two of the short story excerpts had emotional themes, while two others were descriptively 
dense. Readers were instructed to be either (i) spectators and feel sympathy for the protagonist 
(this is what they referred to as the ‘spectator set’) or (i) to imagine what it is like to be the 
protagonist (this is what they referred to as the ‘identification set’). After reading each 
segment, the participants had to indicate whether they felt a ‘fresh emotion’ (i.e., an emotion 
                                                
8 The Yoni Test developed by Shamay-Tsoory & Aharon-Peretz (2007) tests cognitive and affective Theory of 
Mind. 
9 A further, very rudimentary, distinction between sympathy and empathy would be that of ‘feeling with’ as 
supposed to ‘feeling in’. However, it is not so clear cut here, as Cupchik, Oatley, and Vorderer’s definition of 
sympathy appears to consist of two of Davis’ dimensions of empathy mentioned in a previous footnote. 
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roughly corresponding to that of a story character) and/or an ‘emotional memory’ (i.e., an 
emotional episode retrieved from autobiographical memory). They had to rate each kind of 
experience on a scale that measured pleasure, intensity and tension. They also had to indicate 
if they experienced specific primary emotions (e.g. happiness, anger, etc.). Afterwards, they 
were given a two-choice recognition memory task pertaining to setting and person-oriented 
details. The results of this experiment showed that ‘fresh emotions’ were elicited more 
frequently than ‘emotional memories’, though the memories were rated as more pleasant, 
tense, and intense. The emotional excerpts prompted fresh emotions and emotional memories 
almost equally, whereas the descriptively dense passages evoked more fresh emotions than 
memories. The results appear to show that identification makes readers experience ‘fresh 
emotions’ in the moment, as it were, in response to the descriptive texts, while being a 
spectator directs readers toward their ‘emotional memories’. 
 
Another paradigm investigating response patterns closely related to empathy is reported in 
Sikora et al. (2010). The authors explore the notion of expressive enactment, i.e., a mode of 
reading wherein narrated characters, objects, and places are experienced as sensuously present 
across varied iterations. Readers then feel these acutely present “others” to merge with and 
transform their selves. Expressive enactment builds on empathy but goes beyond it in that the 
merging between self and text is experienced to also operate at a metaphorical rather than 
merely literal level. Sikora et al. (2010) collected qualitative data provided in response to a 
poem, The Rime of the Ancient Mariner by S. T. Coleridge. Subjects were asked to mark 
striking and evocative passages and record brief motivations for five of their selections. 
Importantly, expressive enactment was modulated by previous experience of losing a close  
person, as the stimulus text invokes death and mournful moods. More specifically yet, the 
authors found that those bereaved more than two years prior to the experiment had 
significantly higher expressive enactment scores than those with more recent loss experience 
or no such experience at all. Sikora et al. (2010) explain their findings with recourse to the 
temporal dynamics of mourning, pointing to long-term personality change as yet another 
factor in the interplay between reading and empathy-related affective response. 
 
The increasing use of tablets and e-readers for pleasure reading introduces medium (or 
device) as an additional factor in need of systematic empirical investigation. To our 
knowledge, Mangen and Kuiken (2014) are the first to empirically assess the effects of 
reading medium and text manipulation on aspects of narrative engagement, including 
empathy. Their study combined state-oriented measures of narrative engagement and a newly 
developed measure of interface interference. The experiment concerned a two-by-two, 
between-subject factorial design; the first focusing on the medium (booklet versus iPad) and 
the second focusing on the text-type (fiction vs. nonfiction). The experiment produced a 
number of results. One of these was that the booklet readers were more likely to report a close 
association between transportation and empathy. This was not the case with the iPad, 
suggesting that the ergonomics of the reading medium might be of importance for empathy. 
 
The empirical findings reported in this section show a great diversity of research methods and 
conceptualizations. For better overview, they can be categorized, e.g., according to whether 
they measure long-term or short-term effects, whether they make use of a notion of literature 
with its aesthetic implications or only focus on the distinctiveness of fiction (or yet other 
concepts), or whether they account for the possible interference between empathy and a text’s 
subject matter in relation to the individual reader’s life experience. Differences along these 
three variables make comparisons difficult. 
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As for long-term vs. short-term effects, relevant studies converge in suggesting that lifetime 
exposure to fiction affects empathy, but they diverge in the correlations measured and found 
more specifically. Using the RMET, Mar et al. (2006, 2009) and Djikic et al. (2013) conclude 
that empathy increases with fiction compared to non-fiction reading, while Kidd and Castano 
(2013) make a stronger claim for the specificity of aesthetically marked, literary fiction in 
particular. Koopman (2015) reports that empathic response to a text was higher in individuals 
who, in the long term, read more fiction, but her working definition of fiction was constrained 
to literary fiction. When Djikic et al. (2013), inversely, tested for the short-term effects of 
distinctly literary fiction (in comparison to expository non-fiction) on RMET scores, they 
found no such correlation. Koopman’s (2015) findings concerning the short-term effects of 
reading on empathy complicate the discussion further by suggesting that the notion of 
narrativity may have more explanatory power than both fictionality and literariness. In turn, 
several studies in our review refrain from comparing different genre conditions (Johnson 
2013; Wallentin et al. 2013; Sikora et al. 2010; Cupchik et al. 1996). 
 
Finally, the question of personal relevance, in the sense of a productive match between a 
text’s topic and a reader’s previous life experience, is relatively underexplored in empirical 
literary studies despite its prominence in relevant theoretical writing (Caracciolo 2014b; Keen 
2006, 2007). While Cupchik et al. (1998) touch upon experiential background (see also 
Caracciolo 2014b, pp. 45–71) insofar as they record readers’ emotional memories, the idea 
that impactful life experiences modulate affect in reading is addressed only by Sikora et al. 
(2010) and Koopman (2015), and in relation to empathy proper only by the latter. This is a 
research area in serious need of further development as only an inquiry into the role of 
personal relevance can reveal how far it is possible to generalize any conclusions on long-
term and short-term empathy elicited by reading. 
 
5.0 Psychology and neuroscience of empathy  
 
In social cognitive neuroscience, empathy encompasses the ability to respond affectively to 
another person, often, but not always, by sharing that person’s emotional state; the capacity to 
adopt the perspective of another person, and the ability to keep track of self- and other-
feelings (Decety & Jackson, 2004) as a response to directly perceived, imagined or inferred 
feeling states of another being (e.g., Singer & Lamm, 2009). 
 
Everyday language seems to treat empathy, perspective-taking, and ToM, e.g.  the capacity to 
represent others’ intentions and beliefs, as synonyms or near-synonyms all referring to the 
ability to put ourselves in the shoes of another person (Singer, 2006). From a 
neuroscience/neuroscientific perspective, however, empathizing with and mentalizing about 
others’ minds seem to be accomplished in two separate systems, one emotional and one 
cognitive (e.g., Keysers & Gazzola, 2007; Zaki & Ochsner, 2012). Thus, also neurally we 
distinguish between the capacity to share the feelings of others (referred to as ‘emotional 
empathy’) and the capacity to represent others’ intentions and beliefs (ToM or ‘cognitive 
empathy’; Singer, 2006). 
 
The emotional system is active when we experience affective reactions as a result of 
observing the experiences of others, which is when we share a ‘fellow feeling’ (Shamay-
Tsoory, 2011). We can feel empathy for others in a variety of contexts: for basic emotions 
such as anger, joy, fear, sadness, pain and lust, and for more complex emotions such as guilt, 
embarrassment and love (Singer, 2006). 
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Cognitive empathy (ToM), on the other hand, is a cognitive role-taking ability, a capacity to 
engage in the cognitive process of adopting another’s psychological point of view. To have a 
theory of mind entails that we recognize that other people are agents whose behaviour is 
determined by how they perceive the world. To understand their behaviour, we have to take 
account of their perspective as well as the state of the world from our own perspective. We 
have to be able to separate and compare these two perspectives (Gallagher & Frith, 2003; 
Stueber, 2012). 
 
It has been shown that empathising with another person is related to several different neural 
networks, including somatosensory and insular cortices, as well as limbic areas and the 
anterior cingulate cortex. Brain regions activated by cognitive perspective-taking include the 
medial prefrontal regions and the superior temporal sulcus (STS), extending into the parietal 
lobe (temporo-parietal junction) and sometimes also the temporal pole (e.g. Hein & Singer, 
2008). These differences in brain activity between the two systems reflect the extent to which 
empathy is processed automatically or voluntarily (Ochsner et al., 2009), suggesting that 
emotional and cognitive empathy systems have different evolutionary origins (De Waal, 
2008). While emotional empathy—to feel what another is feeling—occurs more or less 
automatically and emerges earlier phylogenetically, cognitive empathy—to think what 
another is thinking—depends more on ontogenetic and developmental aspects (e.g. Stueber, 
2012) and may be specific to humans (Call & Tomasello, 2008; de Waal & Ferrari, 2010).10  
 
Feeling what another is feeling is less cognitively strenuous than thinking what another is 
thinking. Consequently, emotional and cognitive empathy may also be distinguished on the 
basis of bottom-up versus top-down, also described as automatic versus conscious control 
(Keysers et al., 2014 distinguish between spontaneous and voluntary empathy).   
 
In emotional empathy, we obtain knowledge of others’ minds by way of simulation. When 
watching others react in disgust to tainted food, we feel ‘their’ nausea. The feeling of disgust, 
a basic emotion apparently explainable in terms of its adaptive benefits (Curtis et al., 2004), is 
provoked by a wide range of stimuli such as vomit, wounds, rotting meat, slime and maggots, 
which all share a connotation of infectious disease. Studies that compare feeling disgusted 
with observing others feeling disgusted point to an automatic sharing by the observer of the 
displayed emotion, thus suggesting that the sharing reflects “a ‘primitive’ mechanism [that] 
may protect monkeys and young infants from (the) food poisoning […], even before the 
evolution/development of sophisticated cognitive skills” (Wicker et al., 2003, p. 661). 
 
Emotional empathy may also explain those instances where we appear to project our own 
feelings onto others, as demonstrated in a study by van Boven and Loewenstein (2003), in 
which subjects were told a story about backpackers getting lost in a forest and asked to 
imagine how the backpackers would be feeling. Subjects’ predictions of whether thirst or 
hunger would be more bothersome to the fictive hikers without food or water were biased in 
the direction of the participants’ own exercise-induced thirst, sustaining the hypothesis that 
predictions of other people’s mental states are fed by bodily-based simulation of how they 
themselves would feel in a similar situation. According to Bernhardt and Singer (2012), 
affective responses to others strongly correlate with the capacity to monitor feeling states of 
self. 
                                                
10 Note, however, that some of de Waal’s work (2009) seems to contradict this, as do studies on the ToM of 
corvids (see, for example, Bugnyar, Reber and Buckner, 2016). 
	
Empathy, neuroscience and literature 
 
 
14 
 
 
Simulation as a vehicle for empathy and thus knowledge acquisition (even beyond ascriptions 
of other’s mental states; e.g., Barsalou, 2008; Schilhab, 2015c) is widespread. Simulation 
involves a so-called ‘mirror’ system in the brain, such that the same areas are activated when 
we observe another person experiencing an emotion as when we experience that same 
emotion ourselves (Frith & Frith, 2006). The brain’s mirror system is engaged by actions as 
well as emotions (Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004) resulting in, for instance, the automatic 
imitation of others’ movements (Chartrand & Bargh, 1999; Mattar et al., 2005). Hence, 
Keysers et al. (2014) refer to ‘motor’ empathy when subjects vicariously experience activity 
in their motor cortices while observing action and to ‘somatosensory’ empathy when subjects 
experience activity in somatosensory brain regions while viewing others’ tactile and haptic 
sensations (Keysers et al., 2010). 
 
Though described as affect sharing, empathy has to be separated from emotional contagion, 
which is not considered an empathic response because the person incorporates affective states 
without being aware that the feeling is not their own (e.g., Hein & Singer, 2008; Bernhardt & 
Singer, 2012). Hence, the induction of empathy has to involve the perceiving or imagining of 
an emotional state in another person in the absence of any emotional or sensory stimulation to 
our own bodies. Though this imagined or perceived feeling is categorized as similar to what 
we experience ourselves, it is nevertheless distinguishable from feelings that originate in 
ourselves (Decety & Jackson, 2004; Schilhab, 2015a). 
 
Emotional empathy can be dynamically modulated. When confronted with the suffering of 
strangers, we become less affected than when facing the suffering of a loved one (Mitchell et 
al., 2006; Singer et al., 2004). This may result from less motivation to attend to the suffering, 
wilful ignorance of the event or lack of trust in a stranger’s feelings. Studies of factors with 
modulatory effects on the occurrence of empathy have shown that features of the empathizer 
(gender, personality and mood), the relationship between empathizer and target (e.g., 
familiarity with, affective link to and valuation of the other), as well as the empathizer’s 
appraisal of the situation may influence the strength of empathy (Engen & Singer, 2013). 
Empathic brain responses in men were significantly weaker if the subject in pain was deemed 
unfair as compared to a sufferer deemed likeable, an effect absent in empathizing women. 
Likewise, empathic brain responses were reduced if empathizers believed the pain induction 
to be part of a successful therapeutic intervention. Also, the perception of the intensity of pain 
influences empathy to varying degrees. Subjects tend to empathize more with people in acute 
pain as compared to chronic pain (Hein & Singer, 2008).  
 
Cheng et al. (2007) showed that if empathizers are frequently exposed to pain-inflicting 
events in others, as are, for instance, physicians (medical doctors with at least two years of 
practice in acupuncture), the strength of empathic brain responses as compared to activity in 
naïve controls is reduced. The same effect is seen in alexithymic empathizers who are known 
to have difficulties in identifying and describing their own feelings and bodily sensations 
(Bernhardt & Singer, 2012). 
 
When observing other people in painful situations, one’s perception of another’s state is based 
on online stimuli; empathy emerges as a result of activity in action perception networks. 
Though the mirror system is ideally suited to tracking the continually changing states of 
emotion and intention of others, more is needed to tell us about their attitudes and 
predilections. If we want to understand why someone is paralyzed by fear, we tend to orient 
ourselves so we can see what they see. From the knowledge of where a person is looking and 
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what they can see, we may identify the cause of their fear. Seeing the world from another’s 
perspective enables us to realize that other people can have different knowledge from us, 
including, possibly, false beliefs about the world (Frith & Frith, 2006).  
 
In situations where online stimuli are missing, for instance when reading about a fictitious 
figure being hospitalized or socially estranged, the relevant stimuli are offline (Wilson, 2002), 
and affective states depend on the employment of perspective-taking and mentalizing (Engen 
& Singer, 2013). Mentalizing is then accomplished top-down, associated with voluntary 
control; this appears to depend critically on training during ontogeny (Schilhab, 2015a; 
2015b).11 Regarding the emergence of ToM, Slaughter et al. (2007) found that mothers of pre-
schoolers seem to vary both with respect to the frequency with which they address mental 
states while narrating stories and to their production of causal and contrastive clarifications on 
mentalist themes, processes which seem uniquely associated with children’s developing ToM 
(for detailed interpretations of how language influences children’s understanding of mental 
states, see Harris et al., 2005). According to Pavarini et al. (2012), however, the capacity to 
mentalize about other’s mental states may result from a number of co-operative parameters 
and not exclusively from verbal exchange. Pavarini et al. (2012) reviewed 78 research reports 
regarding how to nurture young children’s understanding of the mind, summarizing three 
main suggestions. First, parents should act sensitively and responsively to a child’s mental 
states from very early in their development. Secondly, parents should speak to children about 
mental states in an elaborate and connected way, pointing out their causes and consequences 
and explaining that these may be different for different people. Finally, they should expose 
their children to a wide range of emotions without expressing an overly-frequent or 
inconsistent negative affect. 
 
The trainability of ToM may also explain cultural differences in ToM. According to 
Shahaeian et al. (2011), Western children are typically encouraged to think for themselves, to 
develop their own ideas, and to assert their opinions freely, leading many children to form 
initial conceptualizations of mind in terms of differences of opinion.  By contrast, Chinese 
children are typically taught filial respect and encouraged to conform to the cultural models, 
rules and traditions conveyed by their elders, such that key concepts of mind are initially 
constructed around the insight that people can be either knowledgeable or ignorant (for an 
anthropological approach to ToM see, Luhrmann, 2011). 
 
In light of the online/offline distinction, reading depends on imagination (for a discussion of 
processing abstract visual cues, see Bernhardt & Singer, 2012). Consequently, neural activity 
that corroborates empathizing with fictitious characters seems to be top-down controlled, as in 
cognitive empathy. However, individuals seem to differ with respect to which neural systems 
are employed while listening to excerpts from novels (Chow et al., 2015). Nijhof and Willems 
(2015) found that participants who had high activation in the mentalizing network (anterior 
medial prefrontal cortex) when listening to the mentalizing content of literary fiction had 
lower motor-cortex activity when listening to the action-related content of the story, and vice 
versa. Thus, narratives may elicit different mental activities in different people, with some 
listeners being drawn into a story mostly by mentalizing about the thoughts and beliefs of 
others, while others are preferentially simulating more concrete, action-oriented events (see 
also Willems & Casasanto, 2011). 
                                                
11 Note that the mirror-neuron system also needs training (Catmur et al., 2007). Heyes (2010, p. 789) states: 
‘mirror neurons are formed in the course of individual development and via the same learning process that 
produces Pavlovian conditioning’. 
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In this subsection, we focused on neuroscience studies of empathy that base the distinction of 
cognitive and emotional empathy on their correlation with different brain activities. This 
distinction reiterates the distinction between the phenomenal and interpretive senses of 
empathy discussed in section 2 as well as the distinction between consciousness-attribution 
and consciousness-enactment presented in section 3. 
 
In the neuroscience version of the bifurcated view of empathy, the automatic, bottom-up and 
simulated view (emotional) is contrasted with the conscious, top-down and cognitive view. 
While the neuroscience conception of emotional empathy, by which we obtain knowledge of 
others’ minds using simulation, is highly contentious and antagonistic to phenomenologically 
motivated interpretations, the position gains traction from neurophysiological evidence. In the 
neurosciences, simulation as a phenomenon refers to the re-enaction (re-activation) of neural 
correlates that sustain particular phenomenal experiences. Hence, when emphasizers are said 
to simulate others’ emotions, for instance the feeling of disgust, they emphasize because they 
re-activate the neural correlate corroborating their own previous feeling of disgust. 
 
In the corroboration of this understanding, emotional empathy is typically triggered by online 
signs and depends less on cognizing than on cognitive empathy, which seems far more 
deliberate, trainable and thus variable as a result of cultivation during development. 
Moreover, since in the neuroscience interpretation cognitive empathy draws on mentally 
strenuous abilities to imagine, it is especially this version of empathy that seems to be 
engaged when reading. Although consciousness-enactment has certain overlaps with 
emotional empathy, it still seems to depend on more severe cognitive efforts and a certain 
level of conscious awareness than normally associated with the more spontaneous emotional 
empathy. 
 
 
6.0 Discussion  
 
Now that a wide-ranging overview has been given of the main empirical literary and 
neuroscientific studies on empathy, it is time to turn to questions of comparison, contrast, 
novel insights and further study.     
 
 
6.1 How do the empirical literary results compare and contrast with neuroscientific ones 
 
Sections 3, 4, and 5 clearly illustrate the difficult middle position of, and the pressing need 
for, interdisciplinary endeavors such as the empirical studies of literature. While subtle 
literary theorizing about readers’ first-person experiences of empathy and related phenomena 
is free from the practical constraints of empirical testability, neuroscience provides limited 
insight into empathy as a verbally reportable experience. From the viewpoint of literary 
theory, the empirical literary studies largely fail to address a key distinction between first-
person and third-person experiences of empathy in the broad sense, as elaborated for instance 
in Caracciolo’s (2014b) terms of consciousness-attribution and consciousness-enactment. But 
from the viewpoint of neuroscience, too, they may seem to study empathy and empathy-like 
phenomena with insufficient conceptual precision. 
 
The neuroscience literature reviewed in Section 5 suggests that empathy in literary reading 
possibly comprises a previously non-reflected number of dimensions or levels: a lower-order 
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embodied level (e.g. simple sensory and motor experiences), a lower-order emotional level 
(basic emotions, e.g., fear), a higher-order emotional level (complex emotions and 
motivations, e.g., guilt), various levels of more or less consciously controlled mentalizing 
(monitoring others’ intentions, beliefs, attitudes), and so forth. Some of these dimensions have 
been shown (Hein & Singer, 2008) to operate independently of each other as they are 
channeled through separate neural pathways: the pathway for contagion and the pathway for 
mentalizing. But insofar as empirical literary study is concerned with verbally reportable 
experiences rather than their neural underpinnings, it may not be entirely safe to treat these 
dimensions as necessarily independent or even separate. Their experiential distinctiveness is 
up to empirical literary studies to establish, using their own set of research methodologies 
relying on various forms of self-report. 
 
With the exception of Wallentin et al.’s (2013) study, which seems to corroborate the 
neuroscientifically grounded distinction – or even trade-off (Nijhof and Willems, 2015) – 
between contagion and mentalizing, none of the empirical literary studies reviewed in Section 
4 expressly address this relationship. It is desirable, however, that the relationship is 
addressed more closely in future studies, not least because of the specific ontological nature of 
fiction; readers of fiction may typically be aware, at some level, that their story-based 
experiences are prompted by cues outside themselves, and even outside their immediate 
reality (Keen, 2007). The specific status of fictional stimulation could entail that it is 
inaccurate, in the case of literary reading, to conflate all lower-order (e.g. somatic) responses 
with mere contagion, or to talk about mere contagion on the level of experience in the first 
place. In neuroscience nomenclature (e.g. Schilhab 2015b), that is, story-driven responses in 
reading may hypothetically be experienced as top-down controlled, regardless of the 
psychological complexity of experiential content. This view can also be gleaned from 
Caracciolo’s (2014) theory of narrative experientiality, where it is proposed that in reading, 
first-person consciousness-enactment always co-occurs with some degree of third-person 
mentalizing, i.e., consciousness-attribution (but not vice versa). 
 
In line with the latter view, Cupchik et al.’s (1998) study seems to document a complex 
interplay, rather than dissociation, between contagion and mentalizing. In the study, subjects 
who were explicitly instructed to mentalize (“imagine what it is like to be the protagonist”) 
reported experiencing more character-centered emotions, i.e., emotions that might have 
largely enlisted the affective shortcuts of contagion. Meanwhile, first-person emotional 
memories, relying on autobiographical analogy with characters’ emotions, were paradoxically 
more common in readers who were instructed to distance themselves as “sympathetic 
spectators”. However, the relationship between lower- and higher-order empathic experience 
– or mere contagion vs. mentalizing – could also vary as an artefact of stimulus topic and size. 
Wallentin et al.’s stimulus fairy tale (The Ugly Duckling), and the way it was segmented into 
lines for the purposes of the study, may have teased apart experiences that co-occur in other 
and/or more naturalistic text units. The differences in empathic responses to narratives about 
depression vs. grief observed by Koopman (2015), for example, could also have been partly 
due to differences in subjects’ preconceptions of the two psychological conditions with regard 
to their more distinctly somatic (depression) vs. more complex emotional (grief) nature. 
Empathizing with the former condition would then have elicited more lower-order affect. As 
Wallentin et al. propose, such affect can be associated with higher intensity levels when 
compared to mentalizing, hence the higher self-reported empathy. But it is unlikely that an 
entire narrative about depression elicited little or no mentalizing. 
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A yet more obvious role for the text topic to play in empathic reading comes with the question 
of its familiarity and personal relevance to the individual reader. Koopman observes that, 
among other things, prior personal experience with either of the two extreme conditions led to 
higher empathy in reading. But prior exposure to fiction/literature was another predictor, in 
agreement with Mar et al.’s (2006) and Djikic et al.’s (2013) findings. Throughout readers’ 
lifetime, fiction tends to offer, even on the level of single texts, a broad variety of topics such 
that experienced empathy decrease due to stimulus habituation (Cheng et al. 2007) seems 
unlikely. Finally, the fact that the literary and/or fictional nature (Keen, 2007) of reading 
materials can override readers’ biases, observed on neural levels (Mitchell et al., 2006; Singer 
et al., 2004), toward favoring the familiar over the unfamiliar is encouraging (perhaps most 
poignantly in Johnson, 2013) to all advocates of the use value of reading. More nuanced self-
report designs are needed to empirically ground the experiential salience of the contagion vs. 
mentalizing distinction and to determine which degrees of topic unfamiliarity (see also Keen’s 
typology of empathy strategies, Section 3 above) most effectively open readers’ minds toward 
the unfamiliar. 
 
 
6.2 Novel empathy interpretations: From neuroscience to empirical literary findings 
 
As discussed above, empirical literary studies cannot depend on conceptualizations advanced 
within neuroscience alone, but must pursue their own research methodologies and traditions. 
However, neuroscience studies may inspire this endeavor by pointing to relations assumed to 
be significant between narrative reading and individuals’ cognitive processing.  For instance, 
scrutinizing cognitive processes relating to the distinction between empathy activated bottom-
up and top-down may prove especially helpful in qualifying how the novel provides us with 
the means for developing and fine-tuning a sense of social justice and morality, as Nussbaum 
(2010) claimed. 
 
From a neuroscientific approach, when feeling the feelings of others in place of thinking what 
others are thinking, though top-down activity co-occurs, the involuntary bottom-up activity 
leaves the reader in the grasp of her emotions. Though experientially invigorating, 
phenomenally rich mental states will not, on their own, lead to a better understanding of the 
minds of others.12 Philosophically, it is possible to be in a phenomenally rich conscious state 
in the sense of being in pain or hungry, while still lacking meta-awareness of that state in the 
sense that we know we are in pain and can take actions to obtain relief (Winkielman & 
Schooler, 2011).13  
 
On the other hand, when we take the position of a spectator (e.g., Cupchik et al., 1998), we 
seem to draw on different circuits that downplay phenomenally experienced affective states. It 
is possible then that when subjects experience the more reflective and mentally meta-aware 
cognitive empathy, they distance themselves from complete immersion in the affective state 
in question. Thus, top-down activation likely provides us with the option to switch from 
                                                
12 Note that multiple experiences with different affective states are probably necessary ontogenetic preconditions 
for the later development of ToM (Schilhab, 2015a; 2015b), rendering literature that prompts ‘fresh emotions’ 
(e.g. Cupchik et al., 1998) similarly important. 
13 Winkielman and Schooler (2011) proposed a tripartite model to distinguish between unconscious (mental 
states of which we are genuinely unaware), conscious (aware, but lacking meta-awareness), and meta-conscious 
(internally articulated as states of the perceiver) states (see also Schooler et al., 2011). Emotional contagion (e.g., 
Hein & Singer, 2008; Bernhardt & Singer, 2012) then involves feeling what others are feeling without meta-
awareness. 
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‘fresh’ emotions triggered bottom-up in the present and lacking in meta-awareness to a more 
distanced, bird’s-eye view. For instance, adopting the perspective of the self or a loved one in 
pain—that is, assuming similarity—leads to increased ratings of pain compared to projecting 
a stranger into the same situation. Projecting a stranger leads to lesser pain experiences, as 
recruited regions now also include those involved in the self-other distinction (Bernhardt & 
Singer, 2012). 
 
That employment of networks in addition to the somatosensory is important for meta-
cognitive processing, such as perspectivizing, is corroborated by studies on psychological 
self-distancing from egocentric perspectives (e.g. Kross, Ayduk, & Mischel, 2005; Kross & 
Ayduk, 2009). The ability to adopt a self-distanced perspective when processing particularly 
negative emotions and experiences (a distanced why strategy) enables “cool”, reflective 
processing of emotions, in which individuals can focus on their experience without 
reactivating excessively “hot” negative effects. When analyzing feelings from a self-distanced 
perspective, processing relies somewhat more on reconstruing and perspectivizing, which 
appears more closely connected to deep understanding than to the processing of fresh 
emotions (Kross et al., 2011).  
 
Self-distancing and the ability to perspectivize may also explain Johnson’s (2013) finding that 
the extent of transportation into the narrative is correlated with affective empathy and reduced 
prejudice. The process of temporarily leaving one’s own reality behind during such 
transportation is likely associated with a shift from a state of external monitoring and focus on 
goal-directed activity (‘looking out’) to a more free-form, internally directed mental state 
independent of external stimulus (‘looking in’; Immordino-Yang et al., 2012). Looking-in 
transcends the here and now and reduces externally focused attention or vigilance to the 
environment, thereby increasing opportunities for deeper reflection. The shift from looking 
out to looking in, as it occurs in narrative immersion, advances thinking from ‘what 
happened’ or ‘how to do this’ to construction knowledge about ‘what this means for the world 
and for the way I live my life’ (Immordino-Yang et al., 2012, p. 357). In a study by 
Immordino-Yang et al. (2009), subjects reported that learning about others’ virtue or 
psychological pain from narratives imbued in them a desire to lead a meaningful life or to feel 
gratitude for their own good circumstances. 
 
It is likely that readers who are not easily transported may pay more attention to the external 
world, leaving them less time for deep reflection. When naïve iPad users experienced 
dislocation within a text and an awkwardness in handling the medium, they also experienced 
difficulties with narrative transportation (Mangen & Kuiken, 2014). Unfamiliarity with the 
device was relatively more likely to stimulate externally focused attention at the expense of 
‘looking in’ and narrative transportation; hence such users experienced comparatively fewer 
feelings of empathy.  
 
Importantly, improving self-distancing and deep thinking does not diminish the significance 
of a subject’s interoceptive abilities, that is the somatosensory awareness of the internal body 
(Herbert & Pollatos, 2012; Saxbe et al., 2013). Rather, mentalizing aligns with so-called 
‘reperceiving’, which allows one to deeply experience each event of the mind and body 
without identifying with or clinging to it (Shapiro et al., 2006), a capability often cultivated by 
meditative techniques (Papies et al., 2012). Handling shifts in perspectives is also closely 
connected to our age-dependent (e.g. White & Carlson, 2015) and somewhat trainable 
executive functions (Diamond & Lee, 2011), such as reasoning, problem solving, and 
planning (Diamond, 2013). 
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Thus, in terms of cognitive processes, the novel’s ability to provide us with the means for 
developing a sense of social justice and morality relies on advanced cognition, which needs 
considerable tuition to fully develop (e.g. Slaughter et al., 2007). This leaves open the 
question of whether subjects barred from extensive training of online mentalizing (e.g. 
Schilhab, 2015a) test lower on empathic skills despite the improvements expected as a result 
of reading (e.g. Mar et al., 2009; Djikic et al., 2013). 
 
 
 
6.3 Empathy and digitization 
 
Along with a sharpened, interdisciplinary focus on emotional and affective processes of 
reading, the current digitization adds dimensions that may deepen our understanding of the 
links between narrative reading and empathy. Whether literary or other, reading is typically 
considered a mental phenomenon involving primarily the visual perception of black letters on 
a page. Basically, the perceptual process entails the recognition and identification of letters 
and words, and the sensory salience of the text “as such” (imprinted on paper, or displayed on 
a screen) is minimal. Different from, e.g., paintings and music, literature has hence been 
characterized as an “‘indiscernible’ art form […] [without] a seemingly straightforward, one-
to-one sensory fit” (Burke, 2015) and where perceptual processing is assumed to be marginal 
to the overall experience.14  
 
Experiments are beginning to reveal, however, that reading is indeed multimodal and involves 
sensory modalities beyond vision, as Burke 2015 has suggested. For instance, it has been 
shown that even silent reading involves the auditory cortex (see, e.g., Brück et al., 2014, 
Petkov & Belin, 2013). Additionally, reading, and in particular long-form literary reading, 
entails haptic and tactile feedback: we typically hold the text (in a print book or e-book) in our 
hands and engage in manual actions when turning pages, positioning the device for optimal 
angle and distance, and browsing. Often, these sensorimotor inputs are goal-directed and 
purposeful, as when tracking particular text segments by page turning. They may however be 
less deliberate and more akin to tinkering, as when moving the fingers of the right hand 
towards the upper right corner to prepare for the page turn before the eyes have actually 
reached the bottom of the page (Scarry, 2001, p. 147). Although often anecdotally claimed to 
contribute to the reading pleasure, the nature of this contribution has yet to be empirically 
established. The increasing use of tablets (e.g., iPad) and e-readers (e.g., Kindle) for narrative 
literary reading is a timely catalyst for such research. 
 
Perhaps reflecting a visual bias in reading research, there is by now a substantial amount of 
research on the effect of visual ergonomics of tablets and e-readers on aspects of performance 
(e.g., legibility; visual discrimination; memory and recall). A common finding is that reading 
on e-ink e-readers matches print reading, whereas reading on LCD screens is more often 
associated with visual fatigue and poorer performance (Benedetto et al. 2013, Siegenthaler et 
al., 2012, Siegenthaler et al., 2011, Benedetto et al., 2014, Kang, Wang, & Lin, 2009). With a 
few exceptions (e.g., Benedetto et al., 2013), experiments are typically conducted with short 
                                                
14 Note, however, Burke’s (2015) remark that the perceptibility of literary reading operates on a continuum and 
needs to be operationalized in line with a number of parameters (e.g., kind of literature; reading situation; 
channel of transmission/mediation).  
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texts where no page turning is needed. Alternatively, to ensure adequate experimental control, 
haptics is disabled by, e.g., the experimenter turning the pages on cues from the participant 
(Kretzschmar et al., 2013). 
 
Some interesting empirical evidence at a general level of haptics and empathy is also starting 
to emerge in the past year. This is with regard to how engaging with rough or smooth surfaces 
can affect empathy levels. In a study that employed five different behavioural, neuroscientific 
and field experiments relating to the donating behavior of individuals with regard to charities, 
Wang, Zhu and Handy (2015) discovered that interacting manually with rough surfaces 
generated higher levels of empathy than interacting with smooth surfaces. The exposure to a 
haptic sensation of roughness (as opposed to one of smoothness) led to higher levels of 
attention. This heightened attention in turn led to an enhanced empathic response and a 
greater awareness to the plight of unfortunate others and subsequently to more generous 
donating behavior. This study clearly underscores the impact of contextual cues that are 
presented outside of conscious awareness. This is relevant when it comes to reading literature 
as books and electronic devices clearly afford different non-conscious tactile experiences. 
When reading literature this can be of great importance. In a recent qualitative study 
participants were shown to have resilient feelings as to whether or not they would consider 
reading a novel on a digital device (Burke and Bon, forthcoming). It also all depends which 
way the reading experience is considered. For example, the paper and card of both hardback 
and paperback books can readily be seen as ‘rough’ to the touch, whereas e-readers, laptops 
and mobile phones have a smooth, sleek quality to them, a feature that is actively pushed and 
promoted in e-reader advertising campaigns.15 Conversely, books are often seen to have a 
warm, organic feel to them, whereas electronic devices can feel cold and detached (see Burke 
and Bon forthcoming). Clearly, experimental work is needed here at the level of literary 
reading, taking the Wang, Zhu and Handy study as a starting point.  Interestingly, there have 
also been studies of late that have explored the advantages of applying empathy-related 
knowledge to both the design and the development of human-centred technologies, such as 
those found both in the manufacturing and service industries (Wachowicz et al 2015). Such 
design and development concerns could easily be expanded and applied to the entertainment 
industry, and to e-readers in particular, in order to enhance the empathic and emotive quality 
of the digital literary reading experience. 
 
Since paper-based and screen-based substrates have different sensorimotor contingencies 
(O’Regan & Noë, 2001), future empirical research should accommodate measures of the 
effects of different ergonomic affordances on aspects of perhaps particularly long-form, 
reading behavior and experience. As noted (Section 4.0), to our knowledge only one study has 
so far empirically assessed the effect of haptic and tactile feedback on emotional aspects of 
narrative, literary reading. For this purpose, Mangen and Kuiken (2014) developed the 
Interface Interference Scale (IIS), targeting aspects of haptic engagement and readers’ sense 
of text location.16 Combining such self-report measures17 with more objective methodologies 
                                                
15 The following advertising text - taken from an online review of Amazon’s digital devices for PC World by 
Michael Brown the Executive Editor of TechHive (November 24, 2015) - is typical of how digital devices are 
often marketed … “The $200 Kindle Voyage sits at the tippy top of Amazon’s Kindle lineup, and we really dig 
it. Its cover glass is silky smooth to the touch, and it’s flush with its bezel. These are features you’ll really notice 
if you swipe to turn pages”. http://www.pcworld.com/article/3007395/holiday/how-to-choose-the-right-amazon-
e-reader.html 
16 The IIS consists of three multi-item subscales: Resistance to Distraction (e.g., ”The features of the iPad 
[booklet] interfered with my involvement in the story”), Awkwardness (e.g., ”I felt awkward manipulating the 
iPad [booklet] during reading”), and Dislocation (e.g., ”I always knew how much text I had left to read”). (see 
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(e.g., eye tracking; peripheral physiological measures) can support improved assessments of 
the role of different medium interfaces, and their material and technical features, on emotional 
aspects of narrative, literary reading, such as empathy. Ideally, such multi-method approaches 
may enable us to specify the contributions of particular affordances (haptic; tactile, 
audiovisual; olfactory) on a range of aspects of emotional engagement, hence shedding further 
light on the truly embodied nature of reading. 
 
 
 
7.0 Conclusion 
 
In this paper we have discussed empirical findings within literary studies on empathy, ToM 
and related constructs in light of recent theoretical and empirical developments at the nexus of 
the neurosciences, philosophy of mind and cognitive psychology. Results in empirical literary 
studies indicate that narrative reading has a potential for expanding our empathy. On the other 
hand, studies in the neurosciences and cognitive psychology point to likely cognitive 
processes corroborating this expansion. Together these findings lead to exciting new research 
questions. One such question is whether narratives in the sense of presenting the perspective 
of other people as well as whole world scenarios only partly revealed to the protagonist in 
question are especially efficient in training executive functions and thereby strengthening the 
cognitive capacity for representing. Representing the mental representation of a fictive person, 
especially of what she or he does not know, is probably one of the most difficult cognitive 
operations of all. It is all about taking on the perspective of someone else with regard to a 
topic that we know of, and simultaneously ignoring what we know (Battistelli & Farneti, 
2015). Another burning question is whether replacing printed text with e-reading reduces the 
potential of narrative reading for the expansion of empathy. Recent dramatic increases in the 
use of electronic reading platforms urge literary researchers to intensify studies on whether 
changing the platform for reading extinguishes the means for developing and fine-tuning a 
sense of social justice and morality in narrative reading. As President Obama, leader of the so-
called ‘free world’, recently remarked, “the most important stuff I’ve learned, I think I’ve 
learned from novels”. Would he, we wonder, have made the same claim had all his literary 
reading been done on electronic devices?    
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